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Chapter 11
CYBERCRIME AND JURISDICTION IN ITALY
Giovanni Ziccardi*
11.1 Substantive Cybercrime Law
11.1.1 The Constitution of 1948
The Italian Constitution, drawn up in 1948,
1
 is the most important normative docu-
ment in Italy that includes several specific provisions, contained in many articles,
related to data-protection issues, the secrecy of private correspondence, warrants
that must be granted during search and seizure, and civil-rights protection regard-
ing any aspect of citizens social lives.
These articles of the Constitution, of course, do not directly refer to the elec-
tronic world  in 1948 the technological era was just beginning  but most of the
principles explained in these articles can be extended. The Italian Courts, during
the last twenty years, have done so several times with respect to cyberspace issues.
One of the most important articles of the Constitution  an article that Italian
courts usually extend to cyberspace and to illegal-access issues  is Article 14. The
text of this article is very plain: it states that a) the personal domicile is inviolable,
and that b) inspections and searches may not be carried out except in cases, and in
certain ways, laid down by law, in conformity with guarantees prescribed for safe-
guarding personal freedom.
We will see later on in this chapter that the notion of domicile, according to the
Italian law, is very broad and is, at the same time, a place that is physical and
virtual. The Italian Criminal Code (Codice Penale) regulates trespassing a virtual
dwelling (for example, the computer owned by a user, or an authentication de-
vice) in the same manner as trespassing physical doors and windows to get into a
real dwelling. The basic idea, in court interpretations during these years, is strictly
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connected to the existence of a virtual or electronic domicile alongside the real
one.
The same principles apply to the contents of Article 15 of the Italian Constitu-
tion, which states that the liberty and secrecy of correspondence and of every form
of communication are inviolable, and that limitations thereupon may only be en-
forced by a decision, for which sufficient grounds must be given, of the judicial
authorities with the guarantees laid down by law.
2
The notion every form of communication in the Constitution is very broad and
effective, and extends this high level of constitutional protection not only to the
traditional physical  or snail  mail, but also to virtual correspondence. This
includes not only, obvious though it may be, e-mail, but also non-public mailing
lists and other forms of private transmission of data between individuals.
These two articles of the Italian Constitution have been the first to be applied in
cases where the legislative framework did not have specific technological or
cyberspace-related legal provisions. This legislative framework, however, was to
change a great deal in the 1990s.
3
11.1.2 The first real informatic provisions
The legislative framework related to computer crimes and cyber-investigations in
Italy changed significantly during the years 1992 and 1993. The two most impor-
tant legislative reforms in fact date from more than ten years ago. The first, Legis-
lative Decree (Decreto Legislativo) No. 518 of 29 December 1992, modified the
existing Italian Copyright Act (Law No. 633 of 1941). The second, Act (Legge) No.
547 of 23 December 1993, Replacements and introduction of new articles on com-
puter crimes into the Criminal Code and into the Criminal Procedure Code
(Modificazioni ed integrazioni delle norme del codice penale e del codice di
procedura penale in tema di criminalità informatica), was enacted to modify the
Italian Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code (Codice Procedura Penale)
and to introduce new provisions related to software piracy, computer crimes, and
cyber-investigatons.
4
11.1.3 Copyright law
The 1992 Decree No. 518 addressed copyright in the information age and software
piracy. It became the heart of the Italian legislation protecting intellectual property
2 For a concise but clear description in English of the legal framework of privacy in Italy, see
Privacy International, Italian Republic, in Privacy & Human Rights 2003, Washington, D.C./London,
available at <http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/italy.htm>.
3 See G. Livraghi, Internet freedom, privacy and culture in Italy (and the activity of NGOs), 1
Ciberspazio e Diritto (2000) No. 1, pp. 21-30.
4 See G. Pica, Diritto penale delle tecnologie informatiche [Criminal Law of the Information Tech-
nologies] (Turin, Giappichelli 1999).
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and copyright. It was enacted to implement in Italy the European Community Di-
rective 91/250 that provides software with the same protection as literary author-
ship. As two scholars, Monti and Livraghi, have written, this law defines the
duplication of software for a lucrative purpose as a criminal offense punished
with a term of imprisonment from one to three years. The Decree was intended to
repress the sale of illegal software copies in Italy, but it was interpreted in such a
way as to criminalize even private and non-commercial exchanges.
5
The Copyright Act was subsequently modified and updated through several leg-
islative reforms, during the years 2000, 2003, and 2005. These modifications con-
cerned the punishment of new forms of conduct, especially file-sharing, peer-to-peer
systems, and circumvention of technological protection measures and digital rights
management (DRM) systems.
6
 These provisions essentially protect, in the current
legislative framework, the integrity of copyrighted software, establishing penalties
against selling pirated software and evading taxes on software.
11.1.4 The Italian Computer Crimes Act of 1993
The 1993 Act No. 547, in contrast to the copyright Decree that targeted copyright
law, focused completely on criminal issues, updating the Italian Criminal Code
(CC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to punish also non-traditional or
virtual conduct related to computer crimes.
This Act added several articles to the Italian Criminal Code, thus becoming the
heart of the Italian computer-crime discipline. It is very complex, too broad and
vague in some parts. It contains twelve points concerning many computer-related
criminal activities, including illegal access to information systems, voluntary dam-
age to information systems, trafficking of passwords and access codes, the creation
and diffusion of viruses and worms,
7
 and the creation of false electronic docu-
ments. It also includes a definition of computer crime: a computer crime, for the
purposes of the Italian legislative system, is an offense committed by using com-
puter technologies, from a personal one to portable telephone devices created on
the basis of microchips.
In combination with the copyright law, this Act provides, in Italy, government
organizations, firms, military institutions, banks, companies, and private citizens
5 For more information about this legislative evolution, see A. Monti, The network society as
seen from Italy, paper presented at the Conference for Freedom and Privacy (CFP) 2000 in Toronto (6
April 2000), available at <http://www.cfp.org>.
6 See Art. 71-sexies, Art. 102-quater of the Italian Copyright Act (Law No. 633 of 1941), derived
from Art. 6 of the EC Directive 2001/29/EC concerning the obligation as to technological measures
(the Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective
technological measures) and Art. 171-ter of the same Law.
7 See Y. Amoroso Fernández, Virus informatici: aspetti legali [Informatics Viruses: Legal As-
pects], Informatica e diritto (1999) p. 217; G. Ziccardi, I virus informatici: aspetti tecnici e giuridici
[The Informatics Viruses: Technical and Legal Aspects], Ciberspazio e diritto (2001) Nos. 3-4, p. 347.
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with protection from unauthorized access to computer networks, illegal use of pro-
tected data bases, unlawful copying of chip topographies, and unauthorized use of
codes of credit and phone cards, passwords, or banking accounts.
The Italian Computer Crimes Act is divided into several parts, each one con-
cerning different conduct and provisions. The first part, more specifically the first
four articles, deals with the possession, alteration, or destruction of data or com-
puter systems. These provisions are shaped on the basis of physical counterparts,
in this case the typical damage that can be encountered in the physical world (for
example, someone who voluntarily damages someone elses car), extending these
to information-technology objects  in this case, information systems and the data
that are managed by those systems. The result of this extension is that someone
who damages the data and computer systems of someone else is now also punish-
able.
The second part of the Act deals with unauthorized or pirated access to systems
and with the interception of communications. Also in this case, the Italian legislator
moves from the physical point of view (the domicile, such as a house, and physi-
cal correspondence, for instance, a letter) to punish the trespassing of virtual prop-
erty, i.e., the access to a system against the will of the owner, or the illegal interception
or possession of private correspondence, either static, like an e-mail message, or
dynamic, such as information flows and private chat conversations.
The third part of Act No. 547 of 1993 concerns forging an electronic transmis-
sion, spreading computer viruses, illegally possessing devices to intercept or dis-
rupt communications, and disclosing confidential information. All these provisions
carry penalties of up to six years imprisonment.
8
The first time these new norms were enforced was in 1994, when the Italian
Finance Police started a massive operation, Hardware I, that was the first Italian
operation concerning computer crimes and copyright violations.
9
 It was a nation-
wide operation, and the results were the shutdown of hundreds of bulletin boards
(BBSs) connected to the Fidonet network, alongside many seizures of hardware,
software, blue boxes,
10
 and other electronic devices.
11
 It was the first time, in Italy,
that the target of prosecutors and the police were the so-called telecom pirates: the
8 For a brief description, in English, of the Italian computer crimes legal frameworks see, inter
alia, Michael W. Kim, How countries handle computer crimes (1997), available at <http://
www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/student-papers/fall97-papers/kim-crime.html>.
9 See S. Chiccarelli and A. Monti, Spaghetti Hacker. Storie, tecniche e aspetti giuridici dellhacking
in Italia [Spaghetti Hackers. Stories, Techniques, and Legal Aspects of Hacking in Italy] (Milan, Apogeo
1997).
10 An early phreaking tool, the blue box is an electronic device that simulates a telephone operators
dialing console. () The most typical use of a blue box was to get free telephone calls. Blue boxes no
longer work in most western nations, as the switching system is now digital and no longer uses inband
signaling. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_box>.
11 See C. Gubitosa, Italian crackdown. BBS amatoriali, volontari telematici, censure e sequestri
nellItalia degli anni 90 [Italian Crackdown. BBS Lovers, Telematics Volunteers, Censorship, and
Seizures in 1990s Italy] (Milan, Apogeo 1999).
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main accusation made against the BBS users was that they downloaded, copied,
and transmitted pirated software and that they trafficked data and passwords.
Comparable to the first wave of cybercrime legislation, the years 2000-2005
saw a second wave of legislative reforms, addressing new computer crimes, illegal
content, child-pornography material, and the security of the e-commerce environ-
ment. For example, in 1998, the Italian Act concerning Child Pornography and the
Internet, Act No. 269 of 3 August 1998, was enacted. Several projects have started
to modify the original text, including a Bill approved by the Council of Ministers
on 7 November 2003, and a self-regulatory initiative, the Codice di Autoregola-
mentazione Internet e minori (Self-Regulation Code Internet and Minors), is
sponsored by many institutions, including the Italian Ministry for Innovation and
Technologies. Other examples in this second wave are laws on copyright and re-
lated computer crimes,12  laws concerning terrorism and wiretapping,13  and a law
concerning electronic commerce.
14
I shall conclude this section by describing some of the most relevant cybercrimes
under the Computer Crimes Act of 1993.
Illegal access to a computer system
The conduct which amounts to illegal access to a computer system is clearly de-
fined in the text of Article 615-ter CC, carrying a penalty of one to three years
imprisonment for anyone who enters without authorization a computer or tele-
communication systems protected by security measures, or who remains in the sys-
tem against the expressed or implied will of the one who has the rights to exclude
him.
As, among others, the scholars Pica and Foggetti have noted in several of their
studies,
15
 the content of Article 615-ter and the other offenses introduced by Act
No. 547 of 1993 was drafted using the offense of trespassing (violation of domicile)
as defined in Article 614 CC as a model. As noted above, the Act tends to identify
new forms of unlawful conduct as different kinds of aggression against traditional
legal rights, but it does not consider computer crimes as a new and independent
category that needs to be defined on the basis of new legal rights to be protected.
16
The Explanatory Report to Act No. 547 of 1993 clearly shows the legislators inten-
tion to protect in the definition of illegal access an extension of the sphere pertain-
ing to each individual, which is safeguarded by Article 14 of the Constitution as
well as by Articles 614 and 615 of the Criminal Code.
17
12 Act of 18 August 2000, No. 248; Legislative Decree of 9 April 2003, No. 68; Act of 21 May
2004, No. 128; and Act of 31 March 2005, No. 43.
13 Decree of 18 October 2001, No. 374, and Decree of 27 July 2005, No. 144.
14 Legislative Decree of 9 April 2003, No. 70.
15 See N. Foggetti, Legal analysis of a case of cross-border cyber crime, IV Upgrade, European
Journal for the Informatics Professional (2003) No. 6, p. 43, available at <http://www.upgrade-cepis.org;
Pica> (1999) op. cit. n. 4.
16 See Foggetti, loc. cit. n. 15, p. 43.
17 Ibid.
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Concerning the nature of the security measures that are an element of the criminal
provision, Foggetti notes that prevailing case law considers that, while being a con-
stituent element of the concept of illegal access to a computer system as defined in
Article 615-ter CC, these measures need only show the will of the owner of a spe-
cific system to be protected  they do not have to be really efficacious in a technical
sense. In other words, such measures are not considered so much in terms of how
suitable they are to keep out any intruders, but rather as a way of declaring the
right to exclude others (ius excludendi alios), in parallel with the legislation that
governs the physical domicile (Art. 614 CC).
18
The same law includes a series of aggravating circumstances that affect the pros-
ecution of the offense, allowing the maximum penalty to be raised to five years, for
example, when the system is serving the public interest, or when the intruder is the
system administrator of the network.
Illicit possession of access codes
Another very important provision is Article 615-quater CC, which defines illicit
possession of access codes to information and telematic systems as an offense. This
article carries a penalty of up to one years imprisonment and a fine of up to around
5,000 Euro for whoever, in order to obtain a profit for himself or for another or to
cause damage to others, illegally acquires, reproduces, propagates, transmits, or
delivers codes, keywords, or other means for access to a computer or telecommuni-
cation system protected by security measures, or provides information or instruc-
tions fit to the above purpose.
19
 It is interesting that for this offense, no actual
damage or disruption to the system has to be caused.
11.1.5 The Data Protection Acts of 1996 and 2003
In 1996, a law concerning the protection of personal data was enacted, the Italian
Data Protection Act.
20
 This Law, No. 675 of 1996, implemented the European Com-
munity Data Protection Directive. It was completely modified in 2003 with a brand
new Italian Privacy Code, enacted through Legislative Decree No. 196 of 2003.
This Code protects the privacy and integrity of personal data and penalizes the
illegal processing of this kind of data. It is enforced by the Italian Data Protection
Authority (Garante).
From a cybercrime perspective, an interesting provision in the Italian privacy
law is the obligation to adopt suitable and preventive security measures aimed at
18 Ibid. Cf., Corte di cassazione, 6 December 2000 No. 12732.
19 See Foggetti, loc. cit. n. 15, p. 43.
20 See J. Monducci, La circolazione dei dati personali in Internet [The Dissemination of Personal
Data on the Internet], 1 Ciberspazio e Diritto (2000) No. 1, pp. 31-40.
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preventing the loss or destruction of personal data and unauthorized access to per-
sonal data.
21
11.2 Procedural Cybercrime Law
11.2.1 Network wiretapping
Wiretapping is regulated by Articles 266 to 271 of the Italian Criminal Procedure
Code (hereafter: CPC). It can only be authorized in the case of legal proceedings,
and government interceptions of telephone and all other forms of communications
must be approved by a court order. They are granted for crimes punishable by life
imprisonment or imprisonment for more than five years, for crimes against the
administration punishable by no less than five years imprisonment, for crimes in-
volving the trafficking of drugs, arms, explosives, and contraband, and for insults,
threats, abuses, and harassment carried out over the telephone. The government
interception powers have their counterpart in the Computer Crimes Act, which con-
tains a provision that penalizes the interception of electronic data flows.
22
The procedural articles are also used for the interception of communication be-
tween two modems, especially through Article 266-bis CPC that provides for net-
work wiretapping. Before the Computer Crimes Act of 1993, only telephone
interception was allowed and only in cases of serious crimes (such as arms or drugs
trafficking or usury) as well as only with the authorized instruments of the inquir-
ing authorities. Some scholars noted that the new legislation introduced a general
and undefined concept of network wiretapping that can be used for any suspected
crime or violation that uses information or network technologies, and that the inter-
ception can be carried out by any means including privately-owned equipment,
creating a practically unlimited and unrestricted right of interception.
23
11.2.2 Search, seizure, and network searches
The procedures that can be used by the police to investigate a computer or a net-
work are the same as the Criminal Procedure Code provides for searching persons
or places. These are called instruments of evidence (mezzi di prova) and are laid
down in Articles 244 through 271 CPC. In particular, there are four instruments
used by the police to search for evidence on a computer or a network: inspection
21 See G. Corasaniti, Esperienza giuridica e sicurezza informatica [Legal Experience and Informatics
Security] (Milan, Giuffrè, 2003); P. Perri and S. Zanero, Lessons learned from the Italian law on
privacy, 20 The Computer Law and Security Report (2004) Nos. 4-5.
22 For a brief description of these issues in English, see Privacy International, loc. cit. n. 2.
23 A. Monti, Diritto delle tecnologie dellinformazione e protezione dei diritti civili [Information
Technology Law and Protection of Civil Rights], 1 Ciberspazio e Diritto (2000) No. 1, pp. 41-51.
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(ispezione), search (perquisizione), seizure (sequestro), and tapping (intercettazione).
All these four instruments can be used to search persons, places, computers, net-
works, and communications for evidence.
If the investigation of, for example, a network would cross the Italian border,
there are various options, depending on the state towards which the investigative
activity must be performed. Like with ordinary crimes, in the case of a computer
crime, the general rules for assistance through Interpol or, if the state is in the EU,
for Europol can be applicable; and for countries that have ratified the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 23 November 2001)  not necessar-
ily members of the Council of Europe , legal assistance will be possible through
the provisions of that convention. For investigation activities within the EU, more-
over, the EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance can be used for computer
crimes as well, together with the general procedures of extradition and the Euro-
pean arrest warrant.
11.2.3 Data retention
In 2004, a law concerning data retention was enacted, Law No. 45 of 26 February
2004, which is very important from a cyber-investigation point of view. It was
partially reformed by the Law of 31 July 2004, No. 155, issued to prevent terrorism
activities. It contains the obligation to retain log files concerning telephonic con-
versations for a period of 24 months, plus a further 24 months to prevent or verify
crimes. During the first 24 months, data are stored by the provider and can be
accessed after a court order; during the second 24-month period, data can only be
accessed if there is a crime related to terrorism, organized crime, or damage to
information systems. This law can not be used for electronic (telematic) data flows,
but only for telephone communication systems and telephone data.
11.3 Jurisdiction: the Applicability of Italian Criminal Law
11.3.1 The Locus Commissi Delicti Issue
Obviously, the thing that distinguishes cybercrime from other criminal activities is
basically the cross-border nature of unlawful conduct over the Internet. It is not
always feasible to identify the locus commissi delicti (the place where the offense
was committed) when the offender makes use of informatic and telematic means to
commit the offense, as the same single criminal act often involves many different
activities that are carried out via several intermediate systems or stepping-stones.
24
The attacker may, in fact, violate several computer systems with just one act of
illegal access and carry out several illegal operations on computers that are inter-
24 See Foggetti, loc. cit. n. 15, p. 46.
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connected but physically located in different territories, sometimes in different coun-
tries. In other cases, the place where the initial violation occurs may be the same as
the place where the attacker is located, but the person harmed by the offense may be
somewhere else.
11.3.2 The obligatory nature of Italian criminal law
The first problem is to determine whether or not Italian law can be applied to a
particular event. Article 3 of the Italian Criminal Code, entitled Obligatory nature
of the criminal law (Obbligatorietà della legge penale), defines the principle that
the penal law is imperative, except for the temporal and spatial limits stated by
national law. According to Article 3 CC, Italian criminal law applies to all citizens
or foreigners within the territory of the state, save for those exceptions provided for
by national public law or international law. Article 3 paragraph 2 adds: Italian
criminal law also applies to all citizens or foreigners who are abroad, but limited to
those cases provided for by that same law or by international law.
The obligatory nature, as Foggetti states, is also expressed in the position of the
article itself within the system of the Criminal Code, as it, in fact, comes before the
norms referring to the territorial application of criminal law and the principle of
ignorantia legis non excusat (ignorance of the law is no excuse), and coming after
the principles of legality and the norms referring to ratione temporis (time limita-
tions governing the applicability of criminal law).
Article 3 determines the non-derogable nature of the application of Italian crimi-
nal law based on personal (ratione personae) jurisdiction, whereby it is applicable
to all persons  whether Italian citizens or foreigners, whether in the national terri-
tory or abroad , the only limitations being the principle of legality and the norms
laid down by international law.
25
11.3.3 The principle of territoriality
The principle of territoriality is dealt with in Article 6 paragraph 1 CC, which de-
fines criminal law as being applicable within the whole territory of the Italian state.
It is therefore essential to define where the offense was committed. Article 6 para-
graph 2 provides that the offense is considered to have been committed within the
territory of the state when the action or omission giving rise to the offense is carried
out fully or partially there, or if the consequence of the action or omission was
suffered there.
The Italian Criminal Code, therefore, aims to expand the jurisdiction of Italian
criminal law by establishing a criterion of ubiquity, with the origin or the result
occurring in Italy. This raises the question of how to define the slightest part of a
criminal act that can cause the offense to be considered as having been committed
25 Ibid., p. 46.
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in Italy. The resulting problem of interpretation has found no unanimous solution at
a doctrinal level and also creates divergences in case law.
26
Among legal scholars, there has been much debate about the minimum signifi-
cance of an activity committed within Italian territory in order for Italian law to be
applicable. One interpretation holds that acts committed within the national terri-
tory should constitute a punishable attempt and not be limited to a mere preparatory
act, or even that the offense should be considered as having been committed in Italy
even though only a fragment of the offense, or even a mere preparatory act, was
committed in Italy. This doctrine holds that a criminal attempt can be considered to
have been committed in Italy even though the preparatory acts may not have been
committed in Italian territory, provided that the unlawful act could potentially have
been committed within the Italian territory.
Conversely, according to another criterion based on a literal interpretation of the
norm, the offense should be considered as coming under Italian jurisdiction only
when a part of it, whether completed or attempted, has been committed in Italian
territory, provided that the part was an essential component of the offense. Such a
decision must be taken after the event (ex post) and in relation to the specifics of the
case, and not merely before the event (ex ante) and abstractly. Prevailing case law
seems to accept this latter interpretation.
27
With regard to the minimum requirements to consider an offense as attempted,
for the purposes of applying Italian jurisdiction in compliance with Article 6 para-
graph 2, prevailing case law consider that the part of the act committed in Italy
does not in itself have to be actionable but it is enough that the part of the act which
was committed in Italy, in conjunction with subsequent unlawful actions commit-
ted abroad, could be considered as an attempted or completed offense. This inter-
pretation would seem to accept the theory of the potential commission of the deed.
However, the same ruling
28
 continues with a restrictive interpretation requiring
that an attempted criminal act carried out in Italy must have some corresponding
objective impact on the outside world.
11.3.4 Applicability of the principle of territoriality
The criterion of ubiquity is particularly useful to apply to offenses committed over
the Internet. The main doctrine on the subject considers that Italian jurisdiction
should apply when the data involved in the offense, although they may have been
put on the Internet outside Italy, pass through servers located in Italy, or when the
storage and copying of the data has taken place in Italy.
29
26 Idem, p. 44.
27 Idem, p. 45.
28 Corte di cassazione, Sezione I, 20 March 1963, Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale
1965, p. 118 et seq.; Corte di cassazione, Sezione IV, 22 February 1993, Giustizia penale 1993, II, n.
517, p. 629.
29 See Foggetti, loc. cit. n. 15, p. 46.
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The principle of ubiquity is specifically applicable in cases of defamation over the
Internet. Italian case law states that, on the basis of that principle, an Italian judge
can try such an offense, either if it has been committed in national territory or if the
iter criminis (crime route) was initiated abroad but has been completed, resulting in
a crime, in Italy.30
11.3.5 Applicability of the principle of defense
For the applicability of Italian criminal law, as an alternative to the principle of
territoriality, our judicial system provides for the application of the principle of
defense, through which the criminal law can be applied not on the basis of where
the offense was committed or of the nationality of the offender, but rather on the
basis of who the victim of the offense was.
Thus, according to this principle, Italian criminal law is applicable if the offense
was committed against the Italian state or against an Italian citizen, regardless of
where it was committed. Article 10 CC states that a foreigner who commits, in a
foreign territory, against the Italian state or against an Italian citizen, an offense for
which Italian law specifies life imprisonment or a custodial sentence of no less than
a year, will be punished under that law. This article is a corollary of Article 3 CC,
by which Italian law is universally obligatory, unless it is limited by conflicting
national or international laws.
Whether an unlawful conduct committed by a foreigner in a foreign territory can
be punished under Italian law will also, however, depend on some other conditions:
the offender must be present in Italian territory and there must be either a petition
from the Italian Ministry of Justice or a lawsuit or complaint by the offended party
(Art. 10 para. 1 CC).
Another possibility is provided by Article 10 paragraph 2 CC. If an offense harms
the European Community, a foreign state, or a foreigner, the perpetrator can be
prosecuted according to Italian criminal law if (and only if) (1) he or she is in Italian
territory; 2) the crime carries a penalty of imprisonment for life or not below three
years, and (3) if extradition was not granted or was not accepted by the states
government where the crime was committed or the government of the perpetrators
state.
11.4 A Typical Case: an Attack from ‘Outside’
The scholar Foggetti describes, in several studies, in relation to the problem of
applicable law, a typical cross-border cybercrime case that actually occurred, al-
though it has not yet been tried in court.
31
30 Ibid., p. 48. One of the most important decisions here is Corte di cassazione, 29 April 1980,
Cass. Pen. Mass. Ann. 1981, p. 1558.
31 Ibid., p. 46.
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The case concerns a Swiss hacker who violated a public-interest information sys-
tem in Switzerland, affecting and damaging Italian users connected to the compro-
mised system. The system attacked was of public interest, since thousands of
users from all over the world were connected to it, and because experiments were
conducted and analyzed using the hardware and software resources located in
Geneva. The hacker made use of a local vulnerability of the system, and he up-
graded his privileges from normal user to root user.
He went on to install a rootkit, which made the attack a Trojan-like attack, and
very complex software, including a sniffer, in order to copy the passwords keyed
in on-line, and he installed other programs with backdoors that could later be used
to get back into the system without having to trespass and break it again. The rootkit
also contained some tools to hide any trace of the attack, by altering the system
commands that enable the intrusion to be verified, thereby canceling the activity
logs.
The attack was launched from Geneva, but the copied passwords belonged to
Italian users who were connected to the violated system. The hacker thus commit-
ted the crime in Switzerland, compromising the integrity of a computer system
there, but he cracked the passwords of user subscribers who connected to the
system from Italy. Even though the passwords were keyed in by Italian users, from
computers located on Italian territory, the minimum requirement needed for Ital-
ian law to apply was not fulfilled: the deed of copying the passwords was done
wholly in Geneva, and also the rootkit was installed in the Geneva machines. In this
case, the territoriality principle cannot be applied in order to determine whether the
offense is punishable under Italian law.
Moreover, the principle of defense, explained in the above-mentioned Article 10
CC, was not applicable, since the Italian users had not filed a lawsuit or complaint
against the hacker. Likewise, none of the conditions of Article 10 paragraph 2 were
fulfilled. Therefore, the case was not punishable under Italian law, and the Swiss
law was fully applied.
This would have been different if the rootkit had been installed on an Italian
machine, located on Italian territory. In that case, the violation of an Italian system
would have constituted the final link in the attackers criminal project, and Italian
criminal law could have been applied, not by virtue of the principle of the national-
ity of the offended party, but based on the criterion of ubiquity as set out in Article
6 paragraph 2 CC. The attack would then have implied the minimum necessary
requirement to allow the entire illegal conduct to be tried under Italian law.
11.5 Conclusion
As we have seen, the Italian legislator has preferred to use the categories of old
crimes to discipline computer crimes, and this is probably the main reason for some
interpretative problems that are often faced by the Supreme Court.
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The criteria for cybercrime jurisdiction are the same as those used in general crimi-
nal law, notably the territoriality principle, or the locus commissi delicti principle,
and the principle of defense. For this reason, one could talk of an adaptation of old
principles to new technologies. These principles can be used, with some limita-
tions, to fight cybercrime.
It is very important, given the nature of cybercrime, to regulate investigative
activities beyond state borders. The Convention on Cybercrime is a perfect ex-
ample of an attempt to do this, but the slowness of ratification shows how difficult
it is for many states to accept a limit to their sovereignty.
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